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Abstract 
 
A survey of the safety culture and hazard risk perception has been carried out 
involving 77 maritime pilots around Australia and New Zealand, representing more 
than the 20% of the maritime pilots in each country, in proportional geographic 
distribution. In 82% of the cases, interviews were carried out face to face. Each 
interview was based on a questionnaire designed to be completed in less than one 
hour. Questions on four different aspects were asked, relating to each pilot’s 
professional background, safety culture and perception of risks, navigation and 
pilotage hazards and their perception of the pilot’s role. The main responses in 
addition to the most interesting comments highlighted by the pilots are presented in 
this paper. Finally, the paper makes recommendations which might be considered for 
improving operational performance and safety of navigation.  
 
 
1. Introduction   
 
Seaports have been consistently identified by respective National, State, Territory and 
local governments of Australia and New Zealand as key links in the logistic chains 
between producers and export markets and have become the subject of increasing 
attention with regard to their management and operational efficiency. At the same 
time, marked differences have become apparent2 in the manner in which ports are 
regulated and managed and how they deliver marine services to ensure safe 
navigation, even when located within the same administration. 
 
Within the complexities of the shipping and ports industries with its multiplicity of 
competing interests, maritime pilots, with their independent status (Douglas and 
Geen, 1993), have a critical role in ensuring the safe navigation of vessels in their 
care, by ensuring the orderly transit of pilotage districts in conformance with local 
regulations and rules for navigation, by protection of port facilities and commerce and 
                                                 
1 Presented at the Asia-Pacific Pilotage Conference 2006. Tuesday 14th  - Friday 17th March 2006. 
Sydney. Australia. 
2 Various reports of investigations into maritime incidents relating to vessels under pilotage in 
Australia by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, e.g. Report No.157 Amarantos (2000), Report No. 
178 SA Fortius, (2002), and reports by State maritime safety agencies (e.g. Maritime Safety Victoria), 
and in New Zealand by corresponding reports of investigations by the Transport Accident Investigation 
Commission, e.g. Report No.02-201Jody F Millennium (2002) and of the Maritime Safety Authority 
(now called Maritime New Zealand) and the recent introduction of extensive operating guidelines for 
effective risk management of navigation in New Zealand ports (New Zealand Port & Harbour Marine 
Safety Code (2004) MSA) 
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by providing a defence of the public interest in ensuring effective conservancy 
functions of harbour authorities and protection of the environment.   
 
In every navigable waterway of significance throughout the world, maritime pilots 
conduct ships to and from the oceans to berths at the interface between land and sea 
during the part of each voyage which presents the greatest number of risks, yet their 
role and function remains largely unknown.  
 
Some previous studies of maritime pilotage in Australia, Canada, and the United 
States3 have focussed on on-board issues relating to the master-pilot relationship, 
issues of fatigue, and restructuring of pilot service providers, but none appear to have 
considered the operating culture and effectiveness of the regulated environment of 
ports, harbours, and waterways in which ships are navigated. Commissions of Inquiry 
into maritime pilotage in Canada (1968)4 and New Zealand (1974)5 remain useful but 
are dated by significant changes in the commercial operation of shipping and ports 
and to the statutory and regulatory frameworks within which each operates. In 
addition, changes made appear to have confused and obscured previously accepted 
lines of responsibility in pilotage administration so that pilots and ship masters in 
many districts appear to operate together in a vacuum of unshared responsib ility with 
port operators and harbour authorities.  
 
For these reasons, it was decided to undertake this study in order to assess the current 
safety culture and hazard risk perception among Australian and New Zealand 
maritime pilots.  
 
Safety culture can be defined as the informal set of values and norms that controls the 
way individuals and groups interact with each other and with people outside the 
organisation in order to improve the safety performance (George and Jones, 2002). In 
this way, the values and practices that pilots share can be very useful reducing 
operational, economic and environmental risks from the operation of commercial 
navigation in ports and harbours and other regulated waterways. . This is particularly 
so since human error is recognised as a major causal factor in marine accidents (Baker 
and McCafferty, 2005; Murdoch, 2005). Therefore, identification of areas for 
improvement in the safety culture and risk management provided by maritime pilots 
in regulated environments can contribute in an important way to a reduction in the 
incidence and severity of maritime accidents. 
 
 
2. Objectives  
 
Maritime pilots are a vital part of the maintaining the free flow of goods through ports 
and along the more hazardous coasts of Australia and New Zealand so the proposed 
study intended to investigate the safety culture and hazard risk perception of 
Australian and New Zealand Maritime Pilots by: 
 
1. Collecting data on the safety culture of maritime pilots; 
2. Evaluating the effectiveness of the current regulatory regime for maritime pilots;   
                                                 
3 Marine Navigation and Pilotaging National Research Council (1994). 
4 Canada, The Bernier Commission (1968). Report of the Royal Commission on pilotage 
5 New Zealand (1974) Commission of Inquiry into Harbour Pilotage 
 3 
3. To define and evaluate pilots perceptions as to their role and functions; 
4. Establishing a benchmark for future reviews;  
5. To identify potential areas for improvement in risk management in ports and 
regulated waterways; 
6. To assist improvements in the safety of navigation in pilotage waters; 
7. Preparing and presenting a written report analysing the data and making the report 
available to administrators and maritime industry. 
 
 
3. Methodology  
 
3.1 Development of the survey  
 
The study involved interviewing 20% of the Australian and New Zealand maritime 
pilots in order to gauge opinion and practices. These interviews were carried out 
following a structured questionnaire developed with the purpose of assessing the 
safety culture and hazard risk perception of the maritime pilots. The questionnaire 
was designed to be completed in one hour by participants together with the Chief 
Investigator and consisted of 80 questions. In most cases, options were provided but, 
at the same time, each participant was able to add any comment felt necessary. 
 
The study was broadly based on a questionnaire developed specifically for a study of 
regional airlines of Australia in 1999, to assess aviation safety culture and risk (BASI-
INDICATE Safety Program, 1999).  
 
3.2 Ethics committee approval 
 
Once the questionnaire was developed and before starting with interviews, it was 
submitted to the Human Research Ethics committee of the University of Wollongong 
to ensure that all statutory requirements were met. The Committee reviewed the 
ethical aspects of the research making sure that the questions were appropriate for the 
participants, the confidentiality of the information was ensured, and the process 
followed during the interviewed was suitable.  
 
3.3 Selection of the participants and contacting pilots  
 
The selection of participants was made on a geographical distribution basis. The aim 
of the study was to interview 20% of all the maritime pilots in Australia and New 
Zealand to ensure that no State, region, or port was under or over represented. Pilots 
were also selected on the basis of differing levels of experience in the industry. In this 
sense, it was possible to ensure that there was an equal distribution of the sample in 
all States of Australia and New Zealand and that there was not an excessive number 
of pilots drawn from any given port or region. 
 
Once this initial distribution was completed, the Australian Marine Pilots Association 
(AMPA) and the New Zealand Maritime Pilots Association (NZMPA) were contacted 
and requested to nominate a range of respondents to reply the questionnaire according 
to the pre-determined distribution criteria.  
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Interviews were carried out personally by the Chief Investigator (82% of the cases) 
and only 18% of the interviews were undertaken by telephone because of distance, 
time, or convenience. 
  
The assistance and cooperation of the two Pilots Associations and individual pilots in 
the project was excellent and enabled a large number of pilots to be interviewed (77 in 
total, 51 in Australia and 16 in New Zealand) in a very short period of time.   
 
3.4 Confidentiality 
 
All participants were informed at the outset about the confidentiality of the 
questionnaire. Once interviewed, a unique number was allocated to each participant  
and his / her identity was known only to the Chief Investigator. 
 
The results of the questionnaire are strictly confidential and do not identify any 
individuals or their personal responses. All data is retained in a lockable file cabinet at 
the researcher’s office in the School of Earth and Environmental Sciences of the 
University of Wollongong and no person other than the Chief Investigator has access 
to the original interview material (questionnaires and audio-tapes).  
 
 
4. Questionnaire  
 
4.1. Questionnaire Structure 
 
As stated in Section 3.1, this questionnaire was based in the Bureau of Air Safety 
Investigation questionnaire (1996) for the regional airline industry of Australia.  
 
The maritime pilots’ questionnaire consisted of five sections: 
 
· Part A. Professional Background 
This section contains a set of questions intended to define the profile of the person 
replying the questionnaire, including general demographic descriptors (e.g., age, 
gender), professional background (e.g., training courses, previous experience), 
knowledge of organisational structure (e.g., regulatory authorities, kind of service 
provider) and awareness of the principal protocols relating to pilotage. 
 
· Part B. Safety Culture and Perceived Risk 
In this section statements are made about safety culture and perceived risk, and the 
respondent asked to answer each statement using the following scale: 
 
- Strongly agree 
- Agree  
- Neither agree or disagree 
- Disagree 
- Strongly disagree 
 
· Part C. Navigation and Pilotage hazards 
In this Section, statements describing potential hazards are posed to identify the 
hazardousness of each event in terms of safety of vessels, their crew and cargoes, and 
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the potential risk to the environment together with the likelihood of each. The scale of 
evaluation of these two parameters (hazardous  / likelihood) followed established 
practices of the BASI- INDICATE questionnaire (1996). 
 
· Part D. Perceptions of the pilot’s role 
In this section, pilot perceptions of their task were examined.  To do this, pilots were 
first asked to tick personally relevant options and to then to rank these in order of 
importance. In this section there are also three additional questions on the culture of 
the pilotage district in which the pilots operate using definitions given by Reason 
(1997). 
 
· Part E. Additional Comments 
Finally, Section E provided respondents with the opportunity to record any other 
comments relating to previous questions or to make additional general statements.  
 
4.2. Participant evaluation 
 
In order to evaluate the appropriateness of the questionnaire, participants were asked 
at the end of the study about their views of the purpose of the questions, the interview 
process, clarity of questions and perceived benefits the study might provide. The 
results of this section are presented in Section 5.5.  
 
 
5. Main results of the study 
 
This section will be structured in five sub-sections corresponding to the different parts 
of the interview, the first relating to professional background, the second to safety 
culture and perceived risk, the third to relating to hazards of navigation and pilotage, 
followed by the section on perceptions of the pilot’s role. Finally, the participant 
evaluation results are presented. 
 
5.1. Section A. Professional Background  
 
Section A provides information about the pilots’ background (e.g., age, experience, 
training) and the most interesting initial findings are presented below. 
 
Position 
 
From Figure 1, most pilots interviewed were port / harbour pilots (70%). In addition, 
there are 16% coastal pilots and 10% are both harbourmasters and pilots. The 
remaining two small groups are offshore pilots in Western Australia in the oil and gas 
industry and pilots who are also tug masters. 
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What is your usual position?
10%
16%
70%
1% 3%
Harbourmaster/Pilot Coastal Pilot
Port/Harbour Pilot Pilot/Tugmaster
Offshore Pilot (oil and gas fields)
 
 
Figure 1. Occupational distribution 
Age 
 
The average age of pilots is 50 years, with the youngest age being 31 and the oldest 
age, 66. Distribution by age shows that most of the pilots are between 41-60 years of 
age. As can be seen in Figure 2, only 12% of the pilots are less than 40 years of age.  
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Figure 2. Groups of age for pilots 
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Gender 
 
96% of the pilots interviewed were male and 4% women. Although employed in what 
is still a male-oriented job the three women interviewed each stated that they did not 
feel any kind of discrimination because of their gender. According to all of them, so 
long as a pilot shows confidence in what she is doing there is no problem.  
 
Experience as a pilot 
 
The average experience of pilots in their current port is about 10 years whereas 
previous pilotage experience in another port averages about  3 years. This gives a total 
average experience as pilot of 13 years. 
 
Almost half of all participants have only between 0-10 years of total experience 
working as a pilot (see figure 3). This can be largely explained by the fact many pilots 
have been working for an appreciable time at sea prior to deciding to become pilots 
and to take up a position ashore. Some pilots stated that they had been exempt masters 
for some years before becoming a pilot, but such experience was not taken into 
account by the study. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of the participants according total years of experience as a pilot. 
 
 
Pilots Licence 
 
There is no shared understanding about the bodies who issue pilots licences. Only in 
Tasmania, South Australia, Northern Territory and New Zealand, did all pilots 
nominate the same body. In New South Wales, there is some confusion as to who 
issues the pilot licence, with 43% of pilots thinking that is the port authority, and the 
same percentage thinking that is the State. This may be explained by the changes that 
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have recently occurred during the corporatisation of ports and changes to the 
regulatory authority. In Western Australia, a similar result occurs but to a lesser 
degree.  
 
 
Pilot service provider (PSP) 
 
Most (65%) of the pilot service providers (PSP) are “commercial companies” (Figure 
4). Within this group, there are some different typologies such as pilots being an 
integral part of the port services of a commercial port, or independent pilot service 
provider contracted by a Port Authority, by State or by the Commonwealth to carry 
out the pilotage in their attached districts.  
 
In a second position, but with a much lower percentage there are the “Port 
Authorities” as a type of PSP. In this case, pilots are port employees. The third 
position is shared by the “State” as a PSP (the pilots are State employees) and the 
“Commercial Company + Independent Contractor”. In the latter, the pilots are 
independent contractors working for a commercial company. This is the case of most 
of the coastal pilots. The remaining categories are present in only very low 
percentages.  
 
Kind of pilot service provider
65%
3%
2%
13%
8%
1%
8%
Commercial Company Pilot Association
Independent Contractor Harbour Authority
State Commercial Company+Harbour Authority
Commercial company+Independent contractor
 
Figure 4. Kind of pilot service provider. 
 
 
Regulator  
 
The term regulator where used in this study refers to the authority directly responsible 
for regulating and ensuring navigation safety and pilotage in a pilotage district, 
usually being the harbourmaster (except for coastal pilots). 
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As can be seen in Table 1, identification of the regulator of pilotage and shipping 
safety in ports and harbour districts is unclear for many pilots. In Victoria, there are 
many opinions on who is the regulator of pilotage and for the safety of shipping, 
ranging from “the State” (43%) to “Private Company” (29%) and to “Harbour 
Authority” (14%). The same variation of opinion also appears to occur in Queensland, 
Western Australia, Northern Territory, and in New Zealand. Only Queensland Coastal 
Pilots agree 100% that the regulator of their pilotage districts is AMSA (which may 
be a reflection of the mechanisms of communication maintained by AMSA and its 
various studies, together with the nature of the specific regulation applicable to 
coastal pilots). 
 
 
Table 1. Perceived pilotage district regulator according to location. 
 
 
Training courses for pilots 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, most of the pilots have undertaken Bridge Resource 
Management Courses (71%). This was a requirement of the pilot service provider in 
32% of the cases and of the regulatory authority in 25. Most pilots also have 
completed Advanced Pilot Training Courses (68%). With respect to Revalidation of 
sea-going licences to STCW’95, 57% of the pilots have undertaken such courses, but 
in 12% of the cases it was not mandatory requirement of either the PSP or the 
regulatory authority. However, some pilots revalidate voluntarily in order to maintain 
currency within the maritime industry. 
 
In the case of the AMSA required Professional Development Course for coastal 
pilots, 67% of them have completed this. Overall, 30% of pilots have undertaken 
some form of professional development courses. 
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VIC 
1 
14.3% 
3 
42.9% 
 2 
28.6% 
     1 
14.3% 
TAS  
3 
75.0% 
  1 
25.0% 
     
QLD  
10 
71.4% 
   3 
21.4% 
1  
7.1% 
   
WA 
8 
61.5% 
3 
23.1% 
   1 
7.7% 
  1 
7.7%  
NSW 
1 
14.3% 
3 
42.9%    
3 
42.9%     
SA  
2 
100% 
        
NT  
1 
50% 
   1 
50% 
    
NZ 
2 
12.5% 
 5 
31.3% 
    9 
56.3% 
  
QLD 
coast 
  12 100%        
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Other courses were attended in lower percentages by pilots (i.e. manned model 
course, ship handling simulator courses, or radar observers courses).  
 
Some pilots undertook courses that were not mandatory requirement but did so 
because they were strongly recommended by the pilot service provider.  
 
Apart from the courses described, some pilots also attended other training such as the 
AMPA Audit Training Course, Pilotage Audit Competency Course or obtained a 
Commonwealth Certificate of Recognition of an existing overseas qualification. 
 
Table 2. Training courses for pilots 
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Not undertaken 85% 29% 32% 43% 70% 77% 79% 
Required by 
Pilot Service 
Provider (PSP) 
5% 32% 34% 26% 18% 16% 14% 
Required by 
Regulatory 
Authority (RA) 
9% 25% 23% 17% 6% 0% 5% 
Own choice 1% 4% 7% 12% 3% 6% 2% 
Required by 
PSP+RA 
0% 10% 4% 2% 3% 1% 0% 
 
 
Knowledge requirements for pilot licence 
 
The purpose of this question is to identify what the knowledge requirements were for 
the pilots when first trained. From the answers to these questions, three additional 
categories have been added, being: “I know it because I was a ship master before”, “I 
know now, but not when I was trained as a pilot” and “Not applicable” (as in the case 
of relevance of the ATSB confidential reporting system to New Zealand pilots).  
 
From the results attained, it is possible to say that for 34% of the pilots IMO 
Resolution 9606 (2003) was a part of the knowledge requirements for their licence. In 
44% of the cases, IMO Resolution A.8937 (1999) was also part of the licence 
requirement just as the knowledge of the Port State Control requirements with respect 
to ships navigation equipment and operating standards. In the latter, 22% have 
knowledge of the Port State Control requirements because they were previously ship 
masters, and not because of their training as pilots. A similar result was obtained with 
the IMO SMCP8 Code. Finally, the ATSB reporting system was a part of the 
knowledge requirements of the pilot licence in 50% of Australian Pilots.  
                                                 
6 IMO Resolution A.960 (23) “Recommendations on training and certification and operational 
procedures for maritime pilots other than deep-sea pilots”. 
7 IMO Resolution A. 893 (21) “Guidelines for Voyage Planning” 
8 SMCP, Standard Maritime Communications Phrases  
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Table 3. Knowledge requirements for pilot licence. 
 
IMO A.960 
(Training 
Standards) 
SMCP 
PORT 
STATE 
CONTROL 
IMO A.893 
(Voyage 
Planning) 
ATSB 
Confidential
Reporting 
System 
Required 34% 36% 44% 44% 39% 
Not required 39% 32% 26% 18% 19% 
Not known 14% 8% 4% 4% 1% 
Experience 
as a ship 
master 
4% 17% 22% 17% 7% 
Recent 
knowledge 
9% 7% 4% 17% 13% 
Not 
applicable 
0% 0% 0% 0% 21% 
 
 
5.2. Section B. Safety Culture and Perceived Risks 
 
The principal results relating to Safety Culture and Perceived Risks are:  
 
Training 
 
Most pilots (78%) think that they receive enough training and re-training to do their 
work safely. However, in the case of the coastal pilots, this percentage is not so high 
due to a general belief that commercial competition in coastal pilotage has resulted in 
pilotage rates being depressed to the point where few resources are available for 
training.  
 
Similarly, a lack of training was also identified by pilots in New Zealand and pilots 
employed elsewhere by the State. Some of these pilots believe that if they were part of 
an independent pilot service provider, and not operated by commercial port company 
or  a State authority, more resources would be invested in training.  
 
Although identifying a need for training, most pilots think that experience is 
nonetheless a very important part of a pilot’s training and this view is often linked to 
the belief that experience as a ship master before becoming a pilot is also important. 
Such a prior background is believed by some pilots to provide appropriate skills to 
deal with any situation. In addition, experience in both positions (master and pilot) 
enables a pilot to more readily relate to a master when carrying out a pilot’s job.  
 
Communication 
 
Eighty seven percent of pilots agree with the statement they always work 
cooperatively with each other to ensure timely service and navigation safety. In the 
case of coastal pilots, however, this level of general agreement drops to 42%. 
According to the coastal pilots overall, there is not much communication between 
them because all are very independent. Most of the times, they do not know what 
other pilots do, and difficulty is experienced in working cooperatively with each 
other.  
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An example of this is cited in the fact that passage plans and navigation procedures in 
the Great Barrier Reef Region are not standardised but are individual. Every pilot 
follows individual procedures and the ships find that successive passages through the 
reef areas are undertaken by following different and personal passage plans. Overall, a 
common complaint of coastal pilots was that there were no formalised safety 
management procedures within the Great Barrier Reef with which to provide a 
standard form of guidance for navigation 
 
Commercial pressure 
 
In 53% of all cases, pilots asserted that commercial pressure is present and results in 
navigation being undertaken by compulsion outside existing rules for safe navigation. 
In particular, 67% of coastal pilots registered agreement with the statement relating to 
the negative effects of commercial pressure. Most coastal pilots asserted that they felt 
considerable commercial pressure as a result of unfettered competition between the 
principal companies providing coastal pilotage services.   
 
For the coastal pilots, commercial pressure was linked to a direct effect on safety 
culture and hazard reporting since they felt that they could not report as much as they 
would like to because they need to keep clients happy. Similarly, coastal pilots also 
asserted that depression of pilotage fees due to the commercial pressure did not allow 
PSP to have proper fatigue management systems in place, or to carry out effective 
checks of pilot launches, or to ensure an on-going supply of suitable trainees for pilots 
(since the wage now offered is so low).  
 
Port pilots in New South Wales (71%) and Western Australia (62%) also strongly 
agreed that commercial pressure results in pilots working outside established rules.  A 
particular cause of commercial pressure was attributed to shipping agents seeking to 
reduce the number of tugs used to manoeuvre ships. 
   
For the offshore pilots, commercial pressure was stated to be very low, as they are 
happy with the companies they work for “because they understand the situation”.  
 
Finally, pilots in Victoria felt commercial pressure in only 30% of cases. In general, 
the remaining pilots identified an advantage in working for an independent and unique 
pilot service provider which resulted in reduced commercial pressure. 
 
Investigations of incidents 
 
The opinions of pilots with respect to investigations into navigation incidents are quite 
diverse. In 52% of cases pilots agreed that investigations are carried out by a well-
understood selection and analysis process although they also believed that more pilots 
should be involved in investigation processes. Some pilots suggested that there should 
be a national pool of pilots that could be called upon when an investigation was to be 
carried out, since such experienced professionals would be better able to understand 
what happened and to be able to assess events on the basis of experience. 
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Pilots from South Australia, New South Wales, and New Zealand disagreed more 
with the quality of the processes followed during incident investigations than pilots in 
other jurisdictions. 
 
In general, pilots think that the blaming culture that still exists needs to be 
transformed into an open reporting and positive safety culture. Nevertheless, most 
maritime pilots are satisfied with the investigative processes/systems followed by the 
ATSB (Australian Transport Safety Bureau) in Australia and TAIC (Transport 
Accident Investigation Commission) in New Zealand.  
  
Fatigue management 
 
Most pilots (80%) independently ensure that fatigue is not a matter for concern when 
they do their jobs. Different systems on how to manage fatigue were shown to the 
Chief Researcher in different places. However, it is important to highlight the fact that 
commercial pressure sometimes does not allow fatigue to be managed as effectively 
as pilots would like, and a lack of pilots in some remote areas, such as the Northern 
Territory, makes fatigue management more difficult that in other areas.  
 
Most of the participants (65%) agreed that the harbourmaster or regulator does not 
check fatigue management systems due to lack of time and because of changes in the 
harbourmaster’s role in recent years. However, 83% of coastal pilots asserted that 
their regulator is very aware of the system to control fatigue.  
 
Support provided by VTS 
 
Although 75% of the pilots asserted that support provided by VTS, Signal Stations, or 
Port Control Services is useful, 65% agreed that VTS systems should be managed by 
a pilot. According to them, VTS operators are not well trained to do all the aspects of 
their job because they do not have maritime experience and this leads to mistakes 
being made. 
 
The role of National and States Authorities  
 
Half of all pilots believe that regulatory authorities of the States, Commonwealth and 
New Zealand take a positive interest in the conduct of pilotage services in their 
districts, whereas the remaining half believe that such interest is only evident when 
things go wrong or when there is an accident. This latter opinion is most evident 
among the pilots of New Zealand, the Northern Territory and Tasmania.  
 
Reporting system 
 
Most pilots (88%) state that incident reporting structures are very clear which 
suggests the existence of robust and standardised reporting systems. Coastal pilots, 
however, are more reluctant to report because, according to them, they cannot report 
as much as they like due to the commercial pressure under which they are working. 
The fear of losing clients does not allow them to report all the incidents they see. In 
addition, the fact of their initiating a report may have negative consequences for their 
relationship with their PSP and also with investigating bodies (although the latter 
assessment was not quantified). However, not only coastal pilots feel discouraged 
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from reporting, some port pilots asserted that if a pilot was to report “too much”, the 
PSP would consider such reporting as “trouble-making”. 
 
Another subject related to reporting is the efficiency with which deficiencies or faults 
are rectified. In 65% of the cases, pilots state that the responsible authorities take a lot 
of time to rectify reported problems.  
 
 
5.3. Section C. Navigation and Pilotage Hazards 
 
This section presents the results of the most hazardous and likely events according to 
the pilot perceptions. In order to do so, two rankings of the degree of hazard and 
probability of occurrence have been developed.  
 
 
Hazardousness 
 
The term hazard can be interpreted as any event, activity or phenomenon that can 
cause harm in terms of human injury or ill health, damage to property, damage to the 
environment or a combination of all these (Casal et al, 1996). In this study the 
hazardousness of the event has been defined as the potential to affect safety of ships 
crew, cargo and environment. 
From the responses to the questionnaire, it has been possible to establish a ranking of 
the most hazardous events in pilotage (Table 4). The most hazardous event in pilotage 
is likely to occur when engine starting, steering or anchoring equipment fails during 
manoeuvring or navigating. In 85% of cases, pilots consider these events to be very 
hazardous or extremely hazardous. In addition, this happens quite often (see Table 5) 
making the pilot’s task much more difficult and of increased risk. 
 
The second event of the scale of hazardousness relates to poor boarding arrangements 
(e.g. incorrectly rigged pilot ladders, poor location, poor onboard access). Many pilots 
complained about this aspect of the pilotage task and considered it to be one of the 
most hazardous parts of their job. Moreover, it happens very often (Table 5).  
 
The failure of the tug lines as well as the failure of the master of the ship or personnel 
to follow pilot directions is also considered very hazardous, although the case of tugs 
lines only relates to port pilots and not coastal pilots. Concerning the master’s 
rejection to follow the directions of the pilot (4th statement), even if hazardous, its 
likelihood is low since most pilots believed there is always room for an agreement 
being reached between the master and the pilot.  
 
In 6th position in the ranking there is the “readiness and efficiency of navigation / 
propulsion equipment misrepresented to pilot by master”. According to pilots 
interviewed, ship masters sometimes do not want to reveal information which might 
cause pilots to report to authorities matters that may create problems for the ship. If 
the status and efficiency of the ship and its equipment are misrepresented, the pilot 
may unexpectedly have to deal with a dangerous situation. 
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Table 4. Top ten hazardous events in pilotage. 
TOP TEN HAZARDOUS EVENTS IN PILOTAGE Position 
Starting / steering / anchoring equipment failures when manoeuvring or 
navigating 1 
Poor boarding arrangements (e.g. incorrectly  rigged pilot ladder, poor 
location, poor onboard access) 
2 
Failure of tug lines  3 
Failure of ships master and / or personnel to correctly follow pilots 
directions (e.g. refusal, rejection, intervention by master)  4 
Navigating and ship handling in marginal operating conditions when 
subject to commercial pressure 
5 
Readiness and efficiency of navigation / propulsion equipment 
misrepresented to pilot by master  6 
Pilots navigate vessels outside published guidelines or limits (draft, 
higher swell, lower tide, etc.) 7 
Incorrect operation of ships equipment (missed orders, incorrect 
interpretations, etc.) 
8 
Failure of regulator to enforce efficient regulations for safe navigation 
(e.g., for small craft, adequate UKC, passing rules) 9 
Incorrect ship details provided to pilot / port (draft, efficiency of 
machinery, etc.) prior to pilotage  10 
 
 
The fact that the pilots navigate vessels outside published guidelines or in marginal 
operating conditions has been considered among the 10 most hazardous events 
associated with marine pilotage.  Sometimes pilots have to work even if the tide is 
low, the swell is too high or there are strong winds at or above port limits. This can be 
attributed to commercial pressure in some cases, but also occurs in other places owing 
to routine weather and geomorphologic conditions being poor where pilots become 
inured to the operating conditions in order to “get the job done”.  
 
The 8th and 10th statements in the ranking could be in a higher position but due to 
timely intervention by pilots they are not always so hazardous. In the case of incorrect 
operation of the ships equipment, the pilot usually picks up very quickly the mistake 
made and can solve the problem. Where incorrect ship details are provided to a pilot 
prior to undertaking a pilotage act, the experience and skills of a pilot are particularly 
important, especially where a pilot checks every detail provided when boarding, in 
order to minimise the risk of experiencing problems during the pilotage. Both events 
happen quite often (see Table 5), so it is considered important that pilots are proactive 
in checking and defining problems before they become significant. 
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During the study, it was noted in most of the events statements used for questions, the 
older pilots were, the less hazardous they considered each situation. This can 
undoubtedly be explained on the basis of age having provided more experience to 
draw on.  
 
 
Probability of occurrence 
 
The probability or frequency of occurrence of an event is an important parameter in 
risk assessment (Vilchez et al, 2002). According to the perceptions of the pilots 
interviewed, a ranking of the most likely events in pilotage has been developed (Table 
5). The lack of a conducive working environment for pilotage occurs frequently since 
52% of pilots consider that this happens every month or more often and 31% every 
three months. Here, some pilots noted that creating an effective working environment 
on the bridge of a ship is not only the duty of the shipmaster and the ships bridge team 
alone but also a duty of the pilot. In fact, since it is the pilot who enters in a different 
environment belonging to others, so he / she must respect this. However, some pilots 
also asserted that some shipmasters are consciously difficult and challenging during 
the pilotage task. Other masters simply disappear. In general, pilots recognised the 
diversity of cultures and the consequential need for appropriate behaviour in 
engendering effective bridge resource management. In any case, even if this event is 
most likely, it is not considered really hazardous (ranked in15th position out of 20). 
 
The second most likely event is the failure of ships to prepare and present informative 
and mandatory passage plans. In this, most pilots asserted that ships practically never 
prepare passage plans because they know that the pilot is the person who is going to 
do the job, so they do not bother to engage in what they appear to feel is duplication. 
Some pilots also think that the passage plans produced by ships are of minimal value. 
Moreover, this event has been considered the least hazardous of the 20 events 
assessed. 
 
Pilots reported that poor workplace design is another frequently experienced feature 
of pilotage. In general, pilots get used to it and learn to manage the situation. For this 
reason, they do not consider it really hazardous. However, pilots frequently noted a 
lack of visibility as being a common and most important issue. 
 
In fifth position, pilots nominated failure of the regulator to enforce effective 
regulations for safe navigation. However, in almost all cases, pilots were referring to 
the interference to the navigation of larger vessels caused by small craft. According to 
those interviewed, in 27% of the cases, such events occur every month or more often. 
At the same time, this kind of event is also considered hazardous (9th position in the 
ranking) because many sizable ships do not follow regulations and unreasonably 
occupy the centre of navigation channels when encountering other (piloted) vessels.  
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Table 5. Top ten likely events in pilotage. 
TOP TEN LIKELY EVENTS IN PILOTAGE Position 
Failure of ships to provide working environment conducive to pilotage 
(BRM, attentiveness, etc.)  1 
Failure of ships to prepare and present informative mandatory passage 
plans  2 
Poor workplace design (e.g., wheelhouse instrumentation, location, 
accessibility, visibility, clarity, ergonomic layout, etc.) 3 
Incorrect operation of ships equipment (missed orders, incorrect 
interpretations, etc.)  4 
Failure of regulator to enforce efficient regulations for safe navigation 
(e.g., for small craft, adequate UKC, passing rules)  5 
Poor boarding arrangements (e.g., incorrectly  rigged pilot ladder, poor 
location, poor onboard access)  6 
Inadequate charts, navigation equipment and / or operating language in 
use on ships  7 
Engine starting / steering / anchoring equipment failures when 
manoeuvring or navigating  8 
Incorrect ship details provided to pilot / port (draft, efficiency of 
machinery, etc.) prior to pilotage  9 
Inadequate supervision and/or training of onshore service providers (VTS 
/ Signal Station, lines, tugs)  10 
 
 
Concerning the seventh ranking event, most pilots assert that the main problem is the 
operating language in use on ships rather than the charts (which are not considered a 
significant problem since pilots have their own. Some ships crews have problems with 
the English language. Sometimes mistakes may occur due to misunderstanding of the 
pilot orders. Most of the pilots agreed that they can handle this situation and even if 
this happens quite often it is not considered very hazardous (13th position out of 20). 
  
The inadequate supervision of onshore service providers has also been considered 
hazardous by the pilots because they are an important aid to their work. This question 
evinced many complaints about VTS operators and about their training. One of the 
interesting results from this question was the fact that when all service providers (in 
the same port) were integrated, the pilots were able to ensure that they were checked, 
whereas in those situations where the tugs or lines services are part of a different 
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organisations, pilots were frequently unable to verify that the required services were 
available and on time.  
 
 
“Never experienced” events 
 
After having heard from pilots of the events considered the most hazardous and most 
likely according to pilot perceptions, it was interesting to highlight those that have 
never been experienced by many pilots. In 52% of cases, pilots state that they have 
never failed to produce passage plans prior to piloting vessels. Only in cases of 
insufficient warning did pilots fail to produce formalised passage plans.  
 
In 34% of cases, the pilots never experienced regulations or rules for navigation that 
were inadequate, open to interpretation or unclear. Those pilots also consider that 
existing rules are clear enough and in 31% of cases they consider that updating of 
navigation information is carried out by authorities in a timely manner. This is not a 
surprising result, given the relatively well-developed operating systems of some ports. 
 
About 33% of the pilots interviewed stated that if the weather conditions are not safe 
they would not do the job and that they would not navigate vessels outside published 
guidelines, even if there was commercial pressure. 
  
Also about 30% of the pilots have never experienced an absence of knowledgeable 
support to pilotage from the responsible managers or a lack of real-time information 
for navigation (e.g., tide height, swell height, wind speed) that again, undoubtedly 
reflects experience of a well-run and well-equipped harbour or port. 
 
 
5.4. Section D. Perception of the pilot’s role 
 
In this Section the perception of the pilot’s task was examined, with interesting 
results. 
 
To the question “as a maritime pilot, do you regard your job as being the nature of”, 
the first answer chosen was “Navigation Safety” (Table 6), followed by 
“Environmental Protection”. Both options were ticked by pilots in practically all cases 
(99% and 97%) and were never rated in importance below number 4 (with choice N. 1 
being the most important) in the ranking. “Conservancy Management”, “Commercial 
Task” and “Public Interest” were all in a very similar position (about third place) 
followed at some distance by “Non Commercial Task”, ticked only in 25% of cases. 
A particularly interesting aspect of this response was an indication of how marine 
pilots feel strongly about their role as guardians of navigation safety and protectors of 
the environment, yet at the same time they are able to pragmatically recognise their 
role as being that a “Commercial Task”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
Table 6. Nature of the pilot’s job. 
Nature of: Mean Number Ticked Minimum Maximum 
Navigation Safety 1.3 76 99% 1 4 
Environmental Protection 2.2 75 97% 1 4 
Conservancy Management 2.9 56 73% 1 6 
Commercial Task 3.1 66 86% 1 6 
Public Interest 3.3 55 71% 1 6 
Non Commercial Task 4.5 19 25% 1 6 
 
 
Regarding how pilots see themselves when conducting navigation, the first choice in 
the ranking is “Leader of the Bridge Team” selected in 69% of cases (Table 7). After 
that, and with a similar value, “Advisor to the Master” (chosen by 61%) and “In 
Command of the Vessel” (chosen by 12%) occupy 2nd and 3rd positions. 
 
In the case of “Advisor to the Master”, the word “Only” as it originally appeared in 
the questionnaire (“Advisor to the Master Only”) was taken out by practically all 
pilots who ticked it. The “Representative of the PSP”, “Port Authority” and “Port 
Operator” all occupy middle positions.  In some cases, these three bodies were the 
same. The lowest rankings by far have been “Port or Waterways security” and 
“Additional Navigation Officer”.  
 
Table 7. Role of the pilot when conducting navigation. 
I see myself as: Mean Number Ticked Minimum Maximum 
Leader of the Bridge Team 1.6 53 69% 1 4 
Advisor to the Master 1.9 47 61% 1 8 
In Command of the Vessel 1.9 9 12% 1 6 
Substitute for the Master 2.2 5 6% 1 3 
Representative Pilot Service 
Provider 
2.6 47 61% 1 7 
Representative Port Authority 2.8 28 36% 1 5 
Representative Port Operator 2.8 22 29% 2 5 
Port or Waterways Security 3.2 20 26% 1 6 
Additional Navigating Officer 3.3 25 32% 1 9 
 
 
It is important to highlight that in 20% of cases, other options were provided by pilots 
who did not find an appropriate option in the questionnaire. When this occurred, most 
of these new definitions were ranked first, including:  
 
- “in charge of the navigation of the vessel” 
- “control of the navigation of the vessel” 
- “advisor to the master and ship handling” 
- “manager of high risk operation” 
- “participant in the bridge team” 
- “additional member of the bridge team” 
- “additional officer” 
- “person responsible of the safe conduct of the ship” 
- “advisor to the crew” 
- “in conduct of navigation of the vessel” 
- “advisor to the bridge team”  
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- “member of the bridge team” 
- “coordinator of the pilotage operation” 
 
 
Concerning the question “who most influences navigation safety rules and limits in 
your pilotage area?”, the first option and also the most ticked option was  “Pilots 
Collectively” followed very closely by the “Harbourmaster”. The latter was only 
ticked in 64% of the cases. After that came “Port Authority”, “Regulator” and 
“Pilotage Operator” with similar values. “Masters of Ships” and “Ships Agents” were 
placed last in the ranking, but this does not reflect the opinion of pilots about masters, 
but only indicates that the master is not seen to have much influence in formulating 
rules for the safety of navigation in pilotage waters.  
 
Table 8. Influence on the navigation safety rules and limits in the pilotage area. 
Influence on navigation rules: Mean Number Ticked Minimum Maximum 
Pilots Collectively 1.7 60 78% 1 4 
Harbourmaster 1.9 49 64% 1 4 
Port Authority 2.2 29 38% 1 4 
Regulator 2.2 28 36% 1 6 
Pilotage Operator 2.2 26 34% 1 5 
Pilots Individually 2.4 32 42% 1 5 
Commercial Port 2.4 14 18% 1 5 
Ship Charterers 2.5 2 3% 2 3 
Port Users Committee 3.1 14 18% 1 5 
Harbour Engineers 
/ Hydrographers 
3.5 18 23% 1 6 
Masters of Ships 3.8 13 17% 2 7 
Ships Agents 4.7 3 4% 1 7 
 
 
5.5. Participant evaluation 
 
At the end of each interview a sheet with 5 questions about the design of the 
questionnaire was passed to participants. The aim of this was to assess the level of 
satisfaction of the participants with the questionnaire and also to obtain some 
feedback in order to improve the future design of questionnaires.  
 
All of the participants replied to this last section and the results are presented below: 
 
Question 1. Did you find the questions appropriate for the stated aim of the study? 
 
Not appropriate  1   2   3   4   5   Most appropriate 
 
As it can be observed in Figure 5, most of the participants considered that the 
questions were “very appropriate” or “most appropriate” (85%). Of the remainder, 
14% replied “appropriate” and only 1% replied “slightly appropriate”. None thought 
found the questions “inappropriate”. 
 
.  
 21 
0% 1%
14%
64%
21%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
(%
)
Not
appropriate
(1)
Slightly
appropriate
(2)
Appropriate
(3)
Very
appropriate
(4)
Most
appropriate
(5)
 
Figure 5. Appropriateness of the questions. 
 
 
Referring the appropriateness of the process followed during the interview, 96% of 
the pilots considered it “very appropriate” or “most appropriate”. The rest replied that 
the processes were “appropriate”. 
 
With respect to the clarity of the questions, 30% replied “very clear”, 49% “clear”, 
18% “quite clear” and only 3% replied “slightly clear”.  None replied that the 
questions were “not clear”. One of the problems encountered by some pilots was the 
fact that in section B affirmative statements are combined with negative ones. This 
created some problems between the participants because they could not give a 
straightforward reply and had to think a little bit about the meaning of the statement.  
 
In the fourth question, concerning the emphasis of each one of the sections, most of 
them agreed that the questions were satisfactory, but as it can be seen in Table 9, 19% 
thought that more emphasis could have been placed on “Professional Background”, 
22% thought more emphasis on “Safety Culture”, 12% more emphasis on “Navigation 
Hazards” and 31% believed that more emphasis could have been placed on 
“Perceptions of the Pilots Role”. 
 
Table 9. Emphasis of the questions. 
 More Less Satisfactory 
Professional Background 19% 3% 78% 
Safety Culture 22% 1% 77% 
Navigation Hazards 12% 3% 84% 
Perceptions Pilot's Role 31% 1% 68% 
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Finally, concerning the benefit of the study for maritime pilots, 42% believed the 
study “most beneficial”, 34% “very beneficial”, and 21% “beneficial”. Of the 
remainder, 1% believed the Study to be “slightly beneficial” and 3% of “little benefit” 
(Figure 6).  
 
Two main opinions exist among pilots about the benefit of the study. One is that any 
kind of study carried out to assess the pilots’ performance is positive, and the other is 
that the benefit of the results of this study depends on the people who will listen to 
them. If the regulator and / or government takes some action with regard to the final 
recommendations of the study, this will be beneficial, but some pilots asserted that 
most “bosses” do not listen to the results of these studies, so at the end it does not 
matter.  
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Figure 6. Benefit of the study. 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
As stated earlier, the aim of this study was to assess the safety culture and risk in 
marine pilotage perceived by maritime pilots, but at the same time to give some 
recommendations for the improvement. They are presented below: 
 
· Due to all the changes in recent years in the pilotage structure, the identification of 
the regulator has become a difficult point. There should be a better understanding 
of and by the body that regulates pilots and each pilotage district. Regulators and 
pilots should take action in order to solve this problem. 
 
· Commercial pressure which affects pilots, especially coastal pilots has a direct 
effect on the safety culture, risk, hazard reporting, fatigue management and 
training. It is therefore necessary to reduce commercial pressure on pilots because 
of the potential negative effects on the conduct of the task. 
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· Confidential reporting should be ensured. Pilots should be able to report incidents 
and deficiencies without encountering external / internal pressures or the fear of 
discrimination or retribution or of being automatically blamed in investigations.  
 
· The blaming culture needs to be translated into a safety culture and reporting. If 
there is no feedback about the incidents, it is not possible to build any safety 
management system. 
 
· Standard passage plans should be developed for the coastal pilots of Queensland 
and better communication should be engendered between coastal pilots. 
 
· Adequate resources for training should be guaranteed in pilot services since the 
professional performance of pilotage is essential to the roles of safe navigation, 
protection of the environment, and guarantors of the safe and timely conduct of 
commerce across the thresholds of ports. 
 
· More emphasis on the bridge resource management must be given to avoid the 
high frequency of poor working environments on bridges of ships. The concept of 
teams and unified purpose should be promoted by regulators and authorities and 
be developed among ship masters, bridge teams, and pilots. 
 
· More information should be provided to small craft and regulators should enforce 
existing regulations in order to create and maintain a safe operational environment 
for all users of commercial waterways. 
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